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8 AUG 1978

MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy Director for National Foreign Assessment

FROM: Director of Central Intelligence

SUBJECT: Additional Comments on NIE [REDACTED]
IRAN: PROSPECTS THROUGH 1985

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1. Friday night I hastily dictated comments on NIE [REDACTED] based on a hasty perusal. I've now read the entire document. I continue to be concerned at: 1) the organization of the document; 2) the almost totally nonquantitative nature of the discussion; and 3) the tone of categoric pronouncements rather than comparison and evaluation of pros and cons.

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2. With regard to point 1, the Table of Contents looks like a potpourri of interesting items but I don't get much feel for any direction that it is going. With regard to point 2, such things as the threat from the Soviet Union militarily is described only in the most general terms rather than the number of divisions that can reasonably be brought to bear, etc. With regard to point 3, I have my primary concern. We make a lot of statements as to what is going to happen, including the exact number of aircraft that the Iranians would withhold from the Soviet front in order to be on guard against Iraq. We do not back any of these up nor do we explain why we think something specific is going to happen and what factors might make it not happen. This is particularly true in the "domestic situation" and "foreign policy" sections. I really think we are much less interested in precisely what the Shah's policy is going to be towards Pakistan, for instance, than we are in the factors motivating Iran to be friendly and to be antagonistic towards Pakistan and vice versa.

3. I tried to rough out an outline (attached) of how it might be done better. Clearly it's not very well thought out but I leave it with you as an example of how I think this issue might be approached differently. I sincerely believe that what we have here has a great deal of very useful information in it.

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4. I wonder who our review panel is on this one. This would have been a perfect opportunity for someone like [redacted] who may know little about the subject but could certainly ask why we were writing this and what message we were trying to convey.

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To ES for signature

STANSFIELD TURNER

Attachment

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FOREIGN POLICY SECTION

I Objectives

- A. Historical Factors
- B. Fundamental National Interests
- C. Concepts of the Shah

II Impediments

- A. Economic Limits
- B. Great Power Relations-Balance
- C. Neighbors
 - Afghan
 - Iraq
 - Arabian Peninsula
- D. International Issues
 - South Africa
 - Middle East

III Prospects

- A. For Shah's Policies
- B. Post Shah

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POLITICAL SECTION

I The Power Structure

- A. The Shah
 - Extent/limits of power
- B. The Military
 - Basis/likelihood of loyalty
 - Old/young differences?
 - Spies?
- C. SAVAK
 - Subservience vs. own power base?
- D. Opposition Groups
 - External, Shah, limits on power
 - Own, divisive, limits on power
- E. Terrorist Groups
- F. Impact of Strengths and Weaknesses of Each and Probable Course of Events

II Prospects for Deposition

- A. Overthrow --
 - Military
 - Civil disorder
- B. Soviet Role?
- C. Assassination
- D. Death

III Succession

- A. Plan
 - Forces supporting
 - Forces against
- B. Alternatives

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ECONOMIC SECTION

I The Economy

- A. Strengths
 - Oil
 - Minerals
 - Etc.
- B. Weaknesses
 - Skilled manpower
 - Oil reserves
 - Prospects
 - Etc.

II Prospects

- A. Commitments
 - Military costs
 - Nuclear power
 - Etc.
- B. Industrial Sector
 - Copper, etc. -- bad market outlook
- C. Domestic Sector
 - Flow thru to citizen

III Impact on Foreign Policy

- A. OPEC
- B. Procurement Programs
- C. Competitors

MILITARY SECTION

I Threats -- Qualitative and Quantitative

- A. USSR
 - With NATO war
 - Without NATO war
 - Likelihood
 - Oil?
- B. Iraq
- C. Instability in Afghan
- D. Instability in Arabian Peninsula

II Military Strategy

- A. Concept Behind Procurements
 - Why? From whom?
- B. Concept Behind Deployments
 - Why? To where?

III Military Tactics

- A. Defense against USSR
 - Two approach routes
 - Pluses
 - Minuses
- B. Defense against Iraq
- C. Offense against Iraq
- D. Offense against Arabian Peninsula
 - Projection capability
- E. Offense against Afghan/Pakistan
 - Covert and subversive actions